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Abstract 
In finite repeated games, it is not possible to enforce 
collusive behaviour using deterrent strategies because of the 
"unravel! ing" of cooperative behaviour in the 1 ast period. This paper 
demonstrates that under certain conditions collusion among the players 
can be maintained if they can post a bond which they must forfeit if 
they defect from the cooperative mode. We show that the incentives to 
cooperate increase as the period of interaction grows in that the size 
of the bond required to deter defection becomes arbitrarily small as 
the number of periods in the game increases. 
COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOUR IN FINITE 
REPEATED GAMES WITH BONDING 
It is well known that it is possible ( even with strictly 
positive discounting) to obtain collusive perfect equilibria in 
infinitely repeated games. However, only noncooperative perfect 
equilibria exist in finite games. Even though finite games may last 
for a long time, the cooperative behaviour of the players unravels in 
the final period of play: defection from the cooperative agreement is 
the dominanat strategy in the last period, and backward induction 
renders noncooperative action the dominant strategy in all earlier 
periods. This phenomenon of unraveling is unsatisfactory for two 
reasons. First, it contradicts our intuition that cooperative 
behaviour is more likely to occur when competitors confront each other 
many times. In such situations firms may voluntarily cooperate to 
avoid retaliation by their rivals later on. Second as T, the number of 
repetitions of a game grows large, the behaviour of firms in the last 
periods of play should have a negligible impact on their strategies in 
the beginning periods. This suggests that the unravelling problem 
should not completely destroy the incentives for cooperation as T 
becomes large. 
In this note we demonstrate a way in which cooperative 
equilibrium behaviour may be maintained in finite games of 
sufficiently long duration. Suppose that as a show of their good 
faith, each firm is required to post a small performance bond at the 
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beginning of play.1 The bond is forfeited if the firm ever defects 
from the cooperative mode; if the firm does not defect it receives the 
value of the bond plus accrued interest after the game terminates. We 
show that the ability of firms to maintain collusive behaviour 
increases as the period of interaction between them grows, in that the 
size of the initial bond required to deter defection becomes 
arbitrarily small as the number of periods in thegame becomes large. 
This work is inspired by the interesting analysis of Radner 
(1980). He demonstrates in a Cournot-type of model with zero 
discounting that if firms are content to "almost" achieve their 
optimal responses to other firms' strategies that a fixed number of 
firms will agree to collude for some set number, K, < T periods, 
provided T is large enough.2 The structure of our model differs from 
that of Radner's in that we assume that firms discount the future at a 
strictly positive rate. We assume however, that the discount rate is 
not high enough to preclude the existence of cooperative equilibria in 
infinite repeated games. 
Following most of the literature on repeated games, we suppose 
there are N l 2 symmetric players or firms who compete in a sequence 
of identical single period stage games. We assume that the following 
payoffs to the stage game are well defined and that they are identical 
for all players 
nc The payoff accruing to each firm, whenever all firms 
cooperate 
nn.::: The unique (by assumption) Cournot Nash equilibrium 
nd 
payoff to each firm 
The single period optimal payoff for a single firm 
defection from a collusive agreement. It is defined by 
nd=Max n(S. Is. 
s. 1 J 
1 
c "' j "' i) 
where Si is the action of the defecting firm, Sj is the action 
of the nondefecting firms j, and C is the collusive action, 
Define a trigger strategy for firm i by 
st i 
C if S �' = C I,/ j .P i and t' < t J 
n otherwise 
where n is the Cournot Nash equilibrium action for the stage game. 
In what follows, we let D = 1/(1 + r) be the discount factor, 
where r denotes the discount rate, We are only interested in those 
cases where it is possible to enforce cooperative behaviour in 
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infinite repeated games using trigger strategies. While we allow for 
strictly positive discounting, we want to bound D from below to insure 
the existence of a collusive equilibrium in the infinite repeated 
game. Otherwise, the issue of unraveling in the finite game becomes 
irrelevant. This is the purpose of our first assumption, 
(Al) Given D, lie, n ll • 
\ \ \ 
and lid there exists a collusive equilibrium 
with Si = C V i and t supported by trigger strategies for the 
infinite repeated game. 
Our second assumption concerns bonding in the finite game 
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case. Let T < co be the number of repetitions of the stage game, let B 
be the size of the initial bond that each firm must put up, and let 
P(T) be the amount paid back to each firm after the game concludes. 
Then we assume, 
(A2) P(T) 
U/D)T-l B if S� = C V i, and t .{ T 
1 
0 otherwise 
Imagine for example that an industry collectively obtains a 
performance bond from each firm. Collusion is encouraged by making 
the repayment of the bond and its accrued interest contingent on all 
firms behaving cooperatively. 
Now let us determine the smallest bond required to prevent 
firms from defecting from the cooperative mode in a fin ite T period 
game. Let 0(t) represent the net gain to a single firm which defects 
for the first time in period t, assuming all N-1 of its rivals employ 
a trigger strategy. For t = T we have 
0(T) lid - ll c ( 1/D -r-l) B (1) 
where the last term on the right hand side of (1) is the value of the 
forfeited bond payment. Equation (1) defines the minimum sized bond 
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p(T) that prevents unraveling of cooperative behaviour in the last 
period. From (1) we have 
PCT) 0T-1 (lid _lie) (2) 
Assumption (Al) places restrictions on the relative magnitudes 
of (lid - lie), (lln - lie) and D. According to (Al) it is not profitable 
for a single firm to defect when is rivals employ a trigger strategy 
in an infinite repeated game. This means that the net returns from 
defecting in the first period must be non positive or 
lid + 
CD CD 
ki Dtlln - lie + [ t=l Dtllc 
(lid - lie) + _D _ (lln - lie) i 0 1 - D 
(3) 
Using (2) and (3), it is now possible to show that the bond, p(T), is 
sufficiently large to prevent a firm from defecting in any period 
t .{ T. Notice that if B = PCT), then at time t, the net return from 
defection discounted back to time t is 
0(t) = lid + T � ) 0k-t lln _ (lie+ ) 0k-tllc) 
k='r+l k='r+l 
- Cl/DT-(t+l)) PCT) 
(4) 
t 
(nd _ nc) + D(l - D ) (nn _ nc) 1 - D 
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- (1/DT-(t+l»fl(T) 
1. 
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NOTES 
Alternatively, the bond may be taken out of the profits of each 
firm in the first periods of play. 
Substituting for fl(T) from (2) into (4) and using (3) we obtain 2. Radner obtains the stronger result that K = T if one compares 
fl( t) (1 - Dt)[(nd - nc) + 1 � D (n
n - nc) ] i 0 (5) 
which is what we intended to show. 
Thus according to (2) and (5) the size of the bond required to 
achieve collusive behaviour becomes arbitrarily small as the number of 
repetitions of the game grows large.
3 It seems likely that a similar 
kind of result can be derived for a repeated principle-agent 
relationship when the actions of the agent can not be observed. 
average profits calculated over the entire time horizon, T rather 
than the average profits calculated over just the remaining 
periods of play. This distinction is made clear in Radner (1980, 
Section 7). We believe it is more interesting to assume that 
firms only consider the remaining profit stream in making future 
decisions, and this is the assumption used in our analysis. 
3. Furthermore, the bonding equilibrium is perfect. This is verified 
b y  showing that the trigger strategy is a best response to all 
conceivable histories of play. The only relevant characterization 
of history is whether or not defection has occurred yet, 
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